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We consider the possibility a draft  increases the likelihood individuals will invest in human 
capital in the military. This possibility exists because those drafted have less time to reap the 
return from human capital investment. A draft is more likely to increase human capital 
investment in the military the larger the civilian return to  human capital investment, the shorter 
the additional time one must spend in the military if one invests while enlisted, and the larger the 
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  Recent research has shown how military conscription---the draft---can adversely affect 
individual investment in human capital investment.
1 However, human capital investment also 
occurs within the military. In particular, information technology (IT) workers have become more 
important in the military. In the U.S. in 2001, about 5% of recruits were to what are considered 
IT core jobs: information systems operators, network analysts, and small computer specialists. 
An additional 13% of recruits were to IT related occupations such as navigators and radar 
operators (Hosek et. al., 2004).  
  Computer skills may become more valuable than even the elite special forces personnel 
(Delta Force, Navy Seals, Green Berets, etc. in the U.S.). Berk and Lipow (2008) argue the most 
valued soldiers in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) are in the unit that engages in computer 
hacking. The Israeli computer corps, Mamram, rejects 90% of applicants, and requires a nine 
month training period and a six year enlistment
2 (versus an enlistment of three years for males 
and two years for females required of Israeli citizens after age eighteen). After military service, 
many former Mamram members found IT firms
3 (New York Times, 1999, and Berk and Lipow, 
2008). 
  Berk and Lipow (2008) argue one of the main reasons the IDF’s general staff opposes a 
volunteer military is they believe they would not able to recruit the high ability individuals they 
currently attract in Mamram. Note,  although the IDF relies on a draft, individuals drafted into 
the IDF volunteer for Mamram.  
                                                       
1 These papers include Lau and Poutvaara (2004), Cipollone and Rosolia (2007), Poutvaara and Wagener (2007), and Keller, 
Poutvaara, and Wagener (2009, 2010). 
2 New York Times, 1999. 
3 These include Check Point Software Technologies Ltd., Memco Software Ltd., and Vanguard Security technologies.  
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  The purpose of this paper is to consider a theoretical model in which individuals can 
choose to invest in human capital during military service, or can invest outside of the military. 
The disadvantage of investment as a civilian is individuals must incur a cost for such 
investment.
4 The disadvantage of investing in the military is one may be required, as in 
Mamram, to serve a longer period in the military. We are not interested in the possibility those 
who have already obtained a good deal of human capital will enlist in the military because this 
does not appear to be the case. We also ignore differences in ability, and whether the draft might 
attract those who are more able. That issue is considered in Perri (2010).  
In the next section, the basic model is developed. In Section 3, deferments are considered. 
Section 4 contains a summary of the main results. 
 
2. The model 
2.1. Basic variables 
  Suppose an individual who is drafted and does not invest in human capital serves for a 
period of length l1. We ignore volunteers when there is a draft. With a volunteer military, an 
individual who does not invest in human capital serves for a period of length l2. With either a 
draft or a volunteer military, an individual who invests in human capital while enlisted serves for 
a period of length l3. It is assumed 0 < l1 < l2 < l3 < 1, where potential work life (in or out of the 
military) is normalized at one. When the draft was last used in the U.S., draftees were required to 
serve for two years. The volunteer U.S. military typically requires a four year enlistment, with 
                                                       
4 Clearly one positive aspect of military service, with a draft or a volunteer military, is the benefit a veteran can receive for 
payment of education post-military. We ignore educational subsidies received by those who have served in the military since the 
focus of our investigation is on those who either invest in skills in the military or as civilians, when the skills are the same. See 
footnote seven for more discussion of this point.  
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longer periods for those receiving specialized training.
5 What is important for our considerations 
is the fact l1 < l3. As will be shown, l2 is unimportant for our analysis.  
 Let    equal civilian earnings with no human capital investment, where  is the same for 
all individuals. Suppose all have the same disutility from being in the military, . Let WS equal 
the civilian wage for one who has invested in human capital as a civilian or in the military,  
 < WS. Let h equal the cost to an individual of civilian human capital investment. The time 
required for investment in human capital is not explicitly considered, but is implicitly included in 
h. Note , WS, and  are defined for one’s potential work life, equal to one, and h is a one-time 
amount. Discounting is ignored. 
 
2.2. A volunteer military. 
  The U.S. military has no skill-based special pay (Hosek et. al., 2004), so we assume an 
individual is paid the same in the military whether or not he has acquired human capital.
6 Thus, 
with a volunteer military, it makes no sense for an individual to volunteer, serve for a period of 
l2, and then invest in human capital as a civilian post-military. An individual who wishes to  
invest in human capital as a civilian will do so at the beginning of work life, in order to reap the 
higher earnings for the longest possible period.
7  
  In order to attract enlistees, a volunteer military must pay a wage equal to  + , which 
gives those in the military the same compensation (net of disutility of service) as civilians, . 
Thus, absent human capital investment in the military, an individual is indifferent to volunteering 
                                                       
5 There is a two year enlistment option which usually requires one to serve in the reserves or the National Guard. 
6 Allowing for higher military pay for those with greater skills will not affect the main result in this paper, which is there are 
some situations when a draft might induce more human capital investment in the military. 
7 Clearly many enlist in the military in the U.S. today in order to use educational benefits post-military. However, we are 
interested in human capital acquired in the military, when an individual’s alternative is to invest as a civilian (as with IT skills), 
so we ignore educational benefits.  
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or remaining a civilian. As opposed to not enlisting, an individual will invest in human capital as 
a civilian if WS – h > . It is assumed h varies in the population. If one invests in the military, 
total compensation is l3 + WS(1 - l3): the individual only pays for human capital acquired in the 
military by extending military service by the amount l3 – l1. Volunteering and investing in human 
capital in the military is preferred to investing as a civilian if: 
 
  WS – h < l3 + WS(1 - l3),  
 or  (WS-)l3  hv < h.                                                                                                 (1) 




2.3 A draft. 
  With a draft, we ignore the possibility of volunteers. Draftees are paid less than 
volunteers or else there would be no reason for a draft. Let pay equal a fraction z, 0 < z < 1, of 
h
(WS - )l3  hv




Invest in military 
Would not invest as
a civilian 
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what one would earn with a volunteer military,  + . Thus, while in the military with a draft, 
total compensation is z( + ) –   = z + (z - 1) <  = net compensation with a volunteer 
military. If drafted, one who invests in human capital in the military receives lifetime 
compensation of [z + (z - 1)]l3 + WS[1 - l3]. If drafted, one who does not invest in human 
capital in the military, but invests later,
8 has lifetime compensation of 
 [z + (z - 1)]l1 + WS(1 - l1) – h. One who is drafted and never invests in human capital has 
lifetime compensation of [z + (z - 1)]l1 +  (1 - l1). One prefers investment in the military to 
never investing if: 
 
 [ z + (z - 1)][l3 – l1] + WS[1 - l3] >  (1 - l1).                                                               (2) 
 
  In the Appendix, it is shown ineq.(2) is likely to hold for plausible values for variables. 
Thus, we ignore the possibility of never investing in human capital for draftees. If drafted, 
investing in human capital in the military is preferred to investing post- military if: 
  
 [ z + (z - 1)]l3 + WS[1 - l3] > [z + (z - 1)]l1 + WS(1 - l1) – h, 
   or if [WS - z - (z - 1)][l3 - l1]  hd  < h.                                                                       (3) 
 
2.4. A draft versus a volunteer military. If  hv > hd, we are more likely to have investment in the 
military with a draft than with a volunteer military. For hv > hd, we must have: 
                                                       
8 It is irrelevant whether the individual invests as a civilian before serving for a period of l1 with a draft. What matters is military 
service of  length l1 (when one does not invest in the military and extend service time) reduces the time one can earn the higher 





 {[(1 - z)l3 + zl1] + [l3 – l1][1 – z]} < WS.                                                                   (4)  
  
 If  z1, ineq.(4) reduces to  < WS. If the draft wage approaches the volunteer wage, we 
are more likely to get human capital investment in the military with a draft. The reason is, with 
either a draft or a volunteer military, if z = 1, lifetime compensation when one invests in the 
military is  l3 + WS(1 - l3). Investment in human capital post-military with a draft yields lifetime 
compensation of l1 + WS(1 - l1) – h. With a volunteer military, never enlisting and investing in 
human capital at the beginning of work life yields compensation of WS – h > l1 + WS(1 - l1) – h. 
Thus, the net compensation difference between investing in and out of the military is larger with 
a volunteer military because the alternative for potential volunteers is to invest and never enlist, 
whereas a draftee’s alternative is to invest outside the military and have less time to reap the 
return. Thus, a larger range of h is consistent with investing as a civilian with a volunteer 
military than with a draft,  so a draft is more likely to get investment in human capital in the 
military if z < 1. 
 In  general,  when  z < 1, consider when the draft is more likely to lead to investment in 
human capital in the military. 
 
When WS is larger. With a volunteer military, investing in the military versus investing as a 
civilian involves lost income of l3WS. The loss with a draft from investing in the military instead 
of investing later is (l3 – l1)WS, so an increase in WS implies less of an increase in foregone 
income with a draft than with a volunteer military from investing in the military. 
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When  is smaller. A reduction in  means lower military pay. The opportunity cost of investing 
in the military for a draftee is (l3 – l1)z, and for a volunteer is l3, since the alternative for a 
volunteer is to not enlist. Thus, the opportunity cost of investing in the military is increased more 
for a volunteer as  falls. 
 
When l3 is smaller or l1 is larger. A decease in l3 means the income foregone from investing in 
the military is lower. For a one unit decease in l3, this cost is reduced by WS -  with a volunteer 
military, but is reduced by the amount WS - z -(z - 1) with a draft. Now  
WS - z -(z - 1)  > WS -  if ( + )(1 – z) which is true with z < 1. Because of lower earnings in 
the military with a draft than with a volunteer military, a reduction in the time one must serve if 
one invested in human capital in the military has a bigger impact on foregone income with a 
draft than with a volunteer military, so the likelihood one would invest in the military with a 
draft when one would not do so with a volunteer military is increased. An increase in l1 has the 
same effect as does a decrease in l3. 
 
When  is smaller or z is larger. A change in the disutility of being in the military, , has no 
effect with a volunteer military since the wage fully adjusts as  changes. Since compensation 
with a draft equals z + (z - 1)  j, and 
  
   < 0, a reduction in  increases military compensation 
with a draft, and increases the likelihood a draft, relative to a volunteer military, will induce 
individuals to invest in human capital in the military. An increase in z also increases military 
compensation with a draft. 
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In sum, a larger wage differential between those who have and those who have not 
invested in human capital, a shorter length of additional time required for military service for 
those who invest in human capital in the military, lower disutility from military service, and less 
of a difference in military pay with a draft and with a volunteer military all suggest a greater 




  Heretofore, the possibility of one obtaining a deferment to avoid being drafted has not 
been considered. Deferments may be costless to an individual, say, if a deferment may obtained 
by enrolling in school when one would have enrolled even without a draft. However, consider 
the possibility investing in human capital as a civilian is not sufficient to get a deferment, 
possibly because educational deferments are not available.
9 Now a cost D must be incurred to get 
a deferment. From before, if one does not obtain a deferment, is drafted, and then invests in 
human capital in the military, lifetime compensation is [z + (z - 1)]l3 + WS[1 - l3]. Avoiding 
service and investing as a civilian yields compensation of WS – h – D. Thus, one will choose to 
not defer, be drafted, and invest in the military if: 
 
 l 3[WS - z - (z - 1)] – D  ha < h.                                                                              (5) 
 
 If  ha < hv, we are more likely to have investment in the military with a draft (when 
deferments are possible) than with a volunteer military. Using ineqs.(1) and (5), this requires: 
                                                       
9 Deferments are analyzed in detail in Perri (2010).  
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 l 3( + )(1 – z) < D.                                                                                                  (6) 
 
  The LHS of ineq.(6) is the difference in earnings with the draft versus a volunteer 
military for one who invests in the military. Only if this reduction in military earnings with a 
draft is less than the cost of a deferment is it more likely---with deferments---for there to be more 
investment in human capital in the military with a draft than with a volunteer military. 
  Thus, with deferments, if investment in human capital as a civilian is sufficient for a 
deferment---D = 0---then a draft will not yield more investment in human capital in the military 
than will a volunteer military. The impact of l3, , , and z on the likelihood a draft induces more 
human capital investment in the military than does a volunteer military is the same as when 
deferments do not exist. Without deferments, the alternative to investing in the military is to 
invest as a civilian after spending l1 in the military. With deferments, l1 has no impact on the 
likelihood the draft will induce more investment in human capital in the military since the 




  The decision to invest in human capital while in the military or as a civilian is different if 
one has been drafted  than it is with a volunteer military (or with deferments), when one can 
avoid military service and invest in human capital, earning a higher wage for a longer period of 
time. We have considered the belief of the Israeli Defense Forces’ general staff that fewer 
individuals would be recruited in their computer corps with a volunteer military. This concern  
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should also apply to the US military which increasingly requires computer skills. Because a 
draftee has a lower return from investing in human capital as a civilian---due to the reduced 
civilian work life---there are situations where more human capital investment in the military 
would occur with a draft than with a volunteer military. However, if the cost of obtaining a 
deferment is low enough, a draft will not result in increased investment in human capital in the 
military. 
  All we have considered is the amount of human capital investment in the military. We 
have not considered the welfare effects of such investment. For example, it may be a volunteer 
military leads to higher welfare than with a draft, but would require higher compensation for 
skilled military personnel in order to induce more to enlist and invest while in the military. We 





Proof investing in human capital in the military is likely to be preferred to never investing 
(ineq.(2) holds). 
 
 For  z sufficiently large, ineq.(2), henceforth called I2, holds. If z = 1, I2 becomes WS > .  
If z = 0, I2 becomes ( +  )(l1 – l3) < 0, which does not hold.  
  The LHS of I2 is increasing in WS and decreasing in . Thus, with WS > , suppose 
WS and   (disutility of the military is so high it equals the civilian wage). Thus, we have 
significantly reduced the likelihood I2 holds. We now have I2 holding if: 
 
 z  > 
        
       
 =  ̂.                                                                                                         (A1)   
                                                                                                     
 Now 
  ̂
   
 > 0, so a larger l3, given l1, makes I2 less likely to hold. In the Israeli military,  
l3 = 2l1 (serve 6 years in the IT corps, Mamram, versus 3 years as a simple draftee). If l3 = 2l1, we 
have  ̂ = 
   
    
. Now, with l3 = 2l1,  ̂ is positively related to l1. If l1 = .075 (draftees serve 3 years 
[as in the Israeli Defense Forces] out of a 40 year lifetime in the work force, which is high for the 
U.S. where draftees served 2 years),  ̂   .14. Thus, if draftee pay is more than 14% of what 
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